Abstract
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Introduction
There has been considerable debate recently on whether New Zealand should continue to maintain an independent currency, enter into a monetary union with Australia, or adopt the Australian or US dollar as its currency 2 .
From an international perspective, the key arguments for and against abandoning independent national currencies and monetary policies have varied considerably over time and by country 3 .
For New Zealand, however, Drew et al. (DHMS) , (2001, p 3) have suggested that a key driving force behind recent debates has been the conduct of monetary policy and improved overall performance of the economy in the longer term, rather than dissatisfaction with its floating exchange rate system.
DHMS have also utilised the core model of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's Forecasting and Policy System (FPS) to provide insights into the implications for
New Zealand's inflation and output performance, had it credibly fixed its currency to the Australian dollar (AUD) over the 1990s. Their historical deterministic simulations
show that if New Zealand had faced the relatively looser Australian monetary conditions, then output growth may have been temporarily boosted, but annual inflation would on average have been around 1 percentage point higher. Stochastic simulation results show that the volatility in output and inflation could have been greater under an AUD common currency policy environment, than with New Zealand operating its own monetary policy. Hence, an overall conclusion from these results rests on the relative weighting assigned to the potentially modest output gains, the persistent extra inflation costs, and the greater output and inflation variability. For 2 An evaluation of the key underpinning research can be found in Bjorksten (2001) . See also Drew et al. (DHMS) (2001) , Coleman (2001 Coleman ( , 1999 Hartley (2001); Bowden (2000) ; Grimes (2000) ; Grimes, Holmes, and Bowden (2000) ; McCaw and McDermott (2000) ; and Hargreaves and McDermott (1999) . 3 Bjorksten (2001) provides examples from the Swedish, Finnish and Canadian debates, emphasising that any decision to join a currency union or adopt another country's currency is predominantly political. He categorises the various arguments on: (i) "traditional" Optimal Currency Area (OCA) grounds featuring welfare gains from increased trade; (ii) "new" OCA grounds such as removal of currency risk premia in interest rates, improved portfolio allocation associated with more sophisticated financial capital markets and elimination of home bias; and (iii) crisis avoidance grounds. DHMS refer to the key factor behind currency union in Europe being the desire for tighter political union, and the example, placing a high weight on minimising output and inflation variability implies the New Zealand dollar (NZD) should not be fixed to the AUD, and New Zealand should retain its ability to set monetary policy independent of that set in Australia. The primary aim of this short paper is to present counterfactual deterministic simulation results for 1990 to 1999, to see whether New Zealand could have had cyclically better inflation, output and trade balance outcomes, from facing US interest rate and currency movements. It also provides insights from a macroeconomic perspective on the relative merits of adopting a common currency with the US rather than Australia. Our methodology is the same as that used in DHMS for the AUD, and the empirical results should be seen as complementing the judgements put forward in
Bowden (2000), Grimes (2000) , Hartley (2001) and others, as to whether New Zealand should adopt a common currency with the USD or not.
driving forces in Latin America being dissatisfaction with floating exchange rates and a lack of monetary and inflationary control.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Black et al. (1997) , and Hunt et al. (2000) . 7 For a fuller appreciation of long run outcomes, a possibly important omission from this macroeconomic based analysis could be our not accounting explicitly for potentially significant gains to trade. These could result from reduced financial transactions costs, and the removal of exchange rate uncertainty as non-tariff barriers to exporting by smaller firms. See Grimes (2000) . 8 See Hall et al. (1998) , Grimes et al. (2000) , and McCaw and McDermott (2000 (Figure 1 ) and an exogenous nominal exchange rate growing at the same rate as the US TWI ( Figure   3 ).
9
US nominal long interest rates were lower than those for NZ throughout the 1990s But what of real effective exchange rate movements, which are computed endogenously in FPS? Figure 4 shows the real TWI exchange rate actually faced by NZ, together with those which NZ would have faced from both US and AUS nominal exchange rate movements. Inheriting Australian exchange rate movements would have led to a lower real TWI over the great bulk of the 1990s, but the US real TWI displays significantly different movements and is likely to have generated considerably different outcomes. It would have been considerably less favourable to exporters and potentially more beneficial to NZ's inflation rate, between 1992 and 1994, and in an even more pronounced fashion from mid-1997 onwards.
9 The Bank of England's US TWI was used.
Hence, the combination of NZ adopting a US yield curve and US TWI movements would almost certainly have led to looser monetary conditions. The "on balance" macroeconomic outcomes for inflation, output and the nominal trade balance would not, however, seem a priori as clear cut as those that could be expected from imposing Australian conditions.
Empirical results
Under US monetary conditions, the estimated output gap would have been on average around 0.4 percentage points higher over the 1990s, compared with NZ's historical experience ( Figure 5 ). This is only marginally higher than the 0. 
Conclusions
The more stimulatory monetary conditions associated with a nominal US yield curve and US TWI exchange rate movements, have been applied to New Zealand's economic conditions of the 1990s. 
